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  We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and 
non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), 
where workers' decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the 
evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the 
firms. We show that there exists a continuous of high level steady 
states and only one low level and asymptotically stable equilibrium. 
There exists a threshold value on the initial number of firms to be 
overcome it to located in the basin of attraction of one of the high level 
equilibrium. We show that in each high level equilibrium there coexists 
a share of innovative firms with a share of non-innovative firms, and a 
share of skilled workers (human capital) coexisting with a share of 
unskilled workers. But if the initial share of innovative firms is lower 
than the threshold value, then the economy evolves to a low level 
equilibrium wholly composed by non-innovative firms and unskilled 
workers. Finally, we characterise the equilibria as the evolutionarily 
stable strategies against a field. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The notion of strategic complementarities are widely studied and well 
understood. Thus, the complementarity between investment in R&D 
and innovative firms on the one hand, and human capital 
accumulation on the other is commonly accepted as one of the engines 
of sustained growth. In their seminal papers, Nelson and Phelps (1966) 
and Schultz (1975) show the major role played by education in helping 
workers to adapt to new technologies as well as fostering their 
creation. Redding (1996) formalises such idea within a R&D-based 
growth model originally developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992), to 
argue for the presence of strong strategic complementarities between 
investments of workers in education and of firms' in R&D. He can thus 
demonstrate the likelihood of a development trap when both 
investment types are inactive. More recently, various models have 
shown how skilled labour and high-tech firms complement each other 
to establish a high level equilibrium (see, in particular, Acemoglu, 
1997; 1998). 
However, while the issues associated with the strategic 
complementarities between types of firms and of workers are now fairly 
well understood, their foundations remain not sufficiently analysed. 
Hereafter, we propose a dynamic game-theoretical approach to study 
how such strategic complementarities may lead an economy to settle in 
a high or a low level equilibrium. 
As for the economic intuition, the model considers what is likely to 
happen in LDCs where often a mismatch arises among economic agents 
(i.e. firms and workers) with different profiles. Mexico, for instance, is 
a relatively high-tech country compared to most other Latin-American 
countries, but it is poor in terms of accumulated human capital. 
Argentina and Uruguay, on the other hand, are examples of relatively 
good levels of human capital accumulation coupled with little advanced 
technology. Such empirical observations can be explained as the 
outcome of the strategic behaviors adopted by firms and workers on 
the basis of the given distribution of profiles among economic agents, 
such profiles being defined as high or low. 
Strategic behavior works in this way within our model. Assume that 
potential workers imitate their neighbors in deciding whether to have a 
high or low profile. More specifically, they decide as to whether to go 
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unskilled one without incurring any expenses. Such decisions are 
rational in the sense that they imitate the best performing strategy 
given the current state of the economy. On the other hand, firms' 
decisions depend on the composition of labour profiles available in the 
economy. That is, a firm decides to be innovative through investing in 
R&D, if the number (or proportion) of skilled workers is "large 
enough". Thus, our model studies the existence and properties of 
multiple equilibria in an economy composed by two structured 
populations (of firms and workers) acting strategically in the way just 
defined. It shows that, if the percentage of innovative firms is under a 
certain threshold value, the economy evolves towards a poverty trap 
with the number of skilled workers decreasing to zero so that, 
eventually, it is better for the firms not to invest in R&D. On the 
contrary, if the initial percentage of innovative firms is higher than 
such threshold value, the economy will evolve to a high level 
equilibrium. Our main result is that such equilibrium is a steady state 
of a dynamical system characterised by the fact that mixed 
populations may coexist: non-innovative with innovative firms, skilled 
with unskilled workers. This result matches the experience of many 
developing countries in which there is a mismatch between R&D 
department and human capital accumulation (see Ros, 2003). 
The low level equilibrium (the "poverty trap"), on the other hand, 
corresponds to a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium of a two-
population game in normal form, a property which does not hold true 
for any of the possible high level equilibria. 
Our point is that how a country produce does matter, and not only 
from the point of view of the international competitions. We 
understand that, there are profound social and economical differences 
between a country where a significative percentage of its firms invest 
in R&D and a country where the most of its firms do not invest in 
R&D. First, firms that invest in R&D, experience very rapid growth 
and reductions in cost, spark the development of subsequent industries, 
and increase the productivity of other sectors of the economy. In 
essence, spillover effects from the innovative firms are more efficient. 
Second, jobs in innovative firms require a higher skill level and thus 
pay more than jobs in no innovative firms. 
The paper is organised as follow: Section 2 describes the basic, two-
population normal form game characterising strategies and payoffs for 
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mechanism to analyse the evolution of worker's population. In section 
4 we analyse the evolutive behavior of an economy as depending upon 
its initial conditions. In section 5 the relationships between Nash and 
dynamic equilibria are analysed and the definition is introduced of an 
evolutionary stable strategy against a field. In section 6, we introduce 
a market dynamics for firms, while section 7 draws the conclusions. 
2 THE MODEL 
We consider an economy composed by two populations: workers, W, 
and firms, F, each population being further structured in two clubs.
1 
 W  population has the S  -club of strategists invest in 
improving their individual skills (becoming skilled workers), 
and the NS  club of strategists of low-skill workers. 
 The  F  population has the I-club of strategists of innovative 
firms, which are technologically advanced or R&D-prone, and 
the NI-club of non-innovative firms. 
The contractual period between types of firms and workers is 
characterised by the following assumptions: 
 Asymmetric information. At the beginning of the contractual 
period, workers do not know the type of firm that is going to 
hire them.
2 However the workers need to certify their skill 
levels, by means a certificate. So, firms know their profile, a 
leader-follower information kind of situation (see Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1991). 
 Training cost. To acquire skill the worker incurs a cost  , CS  
while we will assume (only for simplicity) that no cost has to 
be born by firms in order to become innovative. 
 Income. Let us label  () i Bj the gross-benefit of the i-firm hiring 
the j-worker, for all  {, } iI N I   and  {, } . jS N S   At any firm, the 
1A club is a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the 
following: production costs, members' characteristics, or any good characterised by 
excludable benefits (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997). In our case, a club shares a 
common strategy which gives representative payoffs. 
2Note that a firm can have been innovating in a previous period and to stop being it in 
the present one, and reciprocally, a traditionally non innovating can be it in the 
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S  type worker gets a salary  , s  while the NS  type gets 
. ss    
 Skill premia.
3 Assume that the innovative firms I give premia 
to their workers, at the end of the contractual period, while NI-
firms do not share their benefits.
4 Thus, skilled workers, S , 
engaged with an innovative firm, I , are assumed to receive a 
premium  p  while unskilled ones receive a premium  , p  such 
that  0. pp  Thus,  , CS s   i.e. there are not incentives to be 
a skilled worker if there are no skill premia. 
Moreover, there are strategic complementarities between types of firms 
as well as between types of workers. So: 
 If the firm is innovative, the payoff of the skilled worker is 
greater than the payoff of the unskilled one, i.e.: 
. sp C Ssp    
 If the firm is non-innovative, the payoff of the unskilled worker 
is at least as good as the payoff of the skilled worker, i.e.: 
. ssC S    
 For a skilled worker,then, the payoffs obtained by the 
innovative firm are greater than those obtained by the non-
innovative firm, i.e.,  () () . IN I BS p B S    
 For a unskilled, the benefits of the non-innovative firm are 
greater than those of the innovative one, i.e.: 
() () . IN I BN S p B N S   
In summary,for our two population normal form game, the payoff 





,( ) ( ) , ( )




sp C S B S sp s C S B Ss
sp B N S sp s BN S s
    
  
 (1) 
3A seminal paper about the notion of skill premia is Acemoglu (2003). 
4Recall that workers do not know the type of contracting firm. So, at the beginning of 
the productive process, each worker does not know if she is going to receive a 
premium or not. This piece of information is revealed only at the end of the period, 
once she learns the type of contracting firm. Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 53, No. 1.     96
The expected payoff of the S  type worker, given the chances of being 
hired either by the I  or NI  firm, is:  
	 ( ) prob( ) prob( ) ES I s p N Is C S 
   (2) 
where  prob( ) I  represents the probability of being hired by the 
innovative firm and  prob( ) NI  the probability of being hired by the non-
innovative firm. Analogously:  
	 ( ) prob( ) prob( ) EN S I s p N Is 
  (3) 
Hence, workers prefer to be S  type strategists if  () ( ) ES EN S   and 

























Let us label 
()






  and denote the probability for an 
innovative firm to employ a skilled worker by prob( ). S   
Hence, a firm goes innovative if and only if its expected payoff is 
greater than the expected payoff of being non-innovative, that is, 




( ) () () ( )
IN I
I I NI NI
BN S B N S p
S
BN S BS B S B N S p p


   
 (6) 
Let's label prob( ) . s Sx 
  Hence, the threshold level where economic 
agents, firms and workers, prefer to be of high-profiles is  	 ,. su xP   
We find three Nash equilibria, two of them in pure strategies: 
 , AS I 
  and   ,, BN S N I 
  and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
given by  
	 ,(1 ); ,(1 ) ss u u NE X X P P 
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It follows that the A equilibrium Pareto-dominates equilibrium B  
while the latter is the risk dominant equilibrium. 
In the next sections, we study the dynamic complementarities between 
profiles of firms and workers. We consider the dynamics of the 
workers' population when number of innovative firms, salary levels and 
education costs are held constant. We characterise dynamic equilibria 
and derive a threshold value beyond which we exit the low level 
equilibrium. 
3 DYNAMIC IMITATION OF WORKERS 
Hereafter, we consider populations of firms and of workers both 
normalised to 1. Hence,  prob( ) / IP I Q I Q 

  where QI  is the number 
of innovative and Q is the total number of firms. Then, 
prob( ) 1 . NI PNI PI 

    
Let  i R  be the probability that the i   strategist,  {, } , iS N S   raises the 
question as to whether to change her current behavior. Then,  i R  
denotes the average time-rate at which a worker, currently using 
strategy  {, } iS N S  , reviews her choice.
6 
Let  ij P  be the probability that such reviewing worker really switches to 
the strategy  ji 
  . Then, 
() ii j Pi j RP 
  (8) 
is the probability that a worker of the it h   club changes to the  jt h   
one.
7 In the sequel,  (1,0) S e 
  and  (0,1) NS e 
  indicate vectors of pure 
strategies, S  or  . NS   
6This is the behaviorial rule with inertia (see Bjornerstedt and Weibull, 1993; Weibull, 
1995 and Schlag, 1998; 1999) that allows an individual to reconsider her action 
only with probability  (0,1) R   in each round. 
7In a finite population one may imagine that review times of an  S  -strategist in 
population  W  are modeled as the arrival times of a Poisson process with average 
(across such individuals) arrival rate  S R , and that at each such arrival time the 
individual selects a pure strategy according to the conditional probability 
distribution  SNS P . Assuming that all individuals' Poisson processes are statistically 
independent, the probability that any two individuals happen to review 
simultaneously is zero, and the aggregate of reviewing time in the W  player 
population among  S  -strategists is a Poisson process. If strategy choices are Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 53, No. 1.     98
Hence, the expected percentage flow of skilled workers,  , S X   will be 
equal to the percent probability of unskilled changing to skilled 
workers minus the percent probability of skilled changing to unskilled 
workers. For large populations, we may invoke the law of large 
numbers and model these aggregate stochastic processes as 
deterministic flows, each flow being set equal to the expected rate of 
the corresponding Poisson arrival process. 
Rearranging terms, we get the system of differential equations 
characterising the dynamic flow of workers  
S NS NSS NS S SNS S
NS S









where  S X  is the fraction of skilled ( NS X  of unskilled, respectively) 
workers. 
An imitative dynamics, as the one defined by equation system (9), 
makes sense if there are at least two distinct behaviors, one of them 
currently adopted and the other one being a candidate behavior to 
imitate. Needless to say, in this model, if one of the two populations 
disappears the incentive to change vanishes with it. 
Reviewing workers evaluate their current strategy and decide to 
imitate only the successful one. An evaluation rule that seems fairly 
natural in a context of simple imitation, is the average rule, whereby a 
strategy is evaluated according to the average payoff observed in the 
reference group (see Apesteguia et al., 2007).
8 Then, assume that 
potential workers do not observe payoffs of individual neighbors but 
they can, in some way, compute average payoffs in their neighborhoods 
and imitate the behavior with the highest average value. 
statistically independent random variables, the aggregate arrival rate of the 
Poisson process of individuals who switch from one pure strategy  S  to another  NS  
is  . SS N S RP   
8On imitation theory, Vega-Redondo (1997) and Schalg (1998, 1999) pointed out two 
approaches based on the idea that individual who face repeated choice problems 
will imitate others who obtained high payoffs. Anyway, the two models differ along 
two different dimensions, the informational structure ("whom agents imitate") and 
the behavioral rule ("how agents imitate"). It can be show that the difference 
between the two models is mainly due to the different informational assumptions 
rather than the different adjustment rules. So, it is more important whom one 
imitates than how imitates (see Apesteguia et al., 2007). Elvio Accinelli, Silvia London, Lionello F. Punzo, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera    99
Although a worker does not know all true values of the payoff of all 
the other workers, she can take a sample of true values in order to 
estimate the average. Let  () Ei and  () Ej be the estimators of the true 
values  () Ei and  () Ej. Hence, an i   worker changes her current 
strategy if and only if  () () . Ei Ej    
Assume that the probability for an i   worker to become a  j   type 
strategist is such that  
[( ) ( ) 0 ] PEj Ei   (10) 
then, (7) can be written as  
[( ) () 0 ] [( ) () 0 ] SN S N S S S
NS S
X R PEN S ES X RPEN S ES X
XX







Now, let the value  [( ) ( ) 0 ] PEj Ei   increase proportionally to the true 
value  () Ej if  () 0 , Ej   and let such probability be equal to zero if 
() 0 Ej  , i.e.     ,{ , } , ij SN S    
() () 0
[( ) ( ) ]
0( ) 0
Ej i f Ej
PEj Ei
if E j
      
      
 (12) 
where  1
|( ) () | .
EN S ES 
 
  Recall that the share PI  of innovative firms is 
constant, and that salaries 	 ,, ss  premiums 	 ,, pp  and education costs 
CS  are given. Then,  () ES  and  () EN S  are constant, too. 
Recall also that  ()( ) ( ) 0 EN S P I p s 
   while  () ( ) () ES P I p s C S 
   can 
be positive or negative depending on the values PI  and CS . With 
salaries, prizes and CS  given,  () 0 ES   if and only if  . CS s







  (13) 
as the percentage of innovative firms such that  () 0 . ES 
   
Hence, equation system (11) can take one of the following forms: 
(I) If    () 0 ES   and then,  (() ( ) 0 ) 0 , PES EN S  
  the evolution of the 
skilled share in the workers' population is described by  Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 53, No. 1.     100
() SS S XR E N S X  
   (14) 
whose solution is  
()
() ( 0 ) e x p






     
       
 (15) 
being  (0) S X  the fraction of the high-skill workers at time  0 t 
 . 
The share in the population of skilled workers decreases until it finally 
vanishes. But this trend can be modified by changing the parameters 
of the model: a policy maker can implement policies to reduce training 
(education) costs and to increase the skill premia of skilled workers. 
(II) If    () 0 ES  , on the other hand, the dynamical system takes the 
form  
() ( ) () SN S S S N S
NS S
X R ES REN S X R ES
XX
  




  (16) 
Let label  () ( ) NS S AR E S R E N S  
   and  () . NS BRE S  
   
Then, in this case the solution of the differential equation (16) is  
	 () ( 0 ) e x p SS
BB
Xt X A t
AA
    













Note that the share of skilled workers converges to  . B
A  By substitution 
of expected payoffs,  () E  , we get  
	 	
	 	 	  	
NS
NS S
RP I ps C S B
A RP I ps C SR P I ps
   !  

       !  !   
 (19) 
1. Considering  / BA  as a function of the initial percentage on 
innovative firms  , PI  its value increases with  . PI   
2. Notice that, even in the case of all firms being innovative, i.e.: 
1, PI 
  it does not follow that at the limit, all workers are going 






RpsC S R ps
   

      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  Here, 
the share of innovative firms is such that workers are 
indifferent between being skilled or unskilled. As  , u P    the 









is the limit value of the share of skilled workers. 
4 INITIAL CONDITIONS MATTER 
Does the initial number of innovative firms explain the path of the 
economy? Consider two countries, 1 and 2. Assume the respective 
percentage of innovative firms in  0 tt 
  to be:  12 PI PI   so that, from 
the solution of equation (16), the share of skilled in the workers' 
population in country 1 is, for each  0, tt   larger than in country 2,  
i.e.,  
12 0 () () , SS Xt Xt t t    (22) 
then, the equilibrium state is higher in country 1 than in country 2.  
Figure 1: Evolution and steady states, initial condition matter 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the dynamical system when the initial 
percentage of the innovative firms is above or below such threshold 
value: 
1. if PI   , then: Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 53, No. 1.     102
 if  (0) , B
S A X   skilled workers decrease in the population and 
their share converges to  , B
A   
 if  (0) , B
S A X   skilled workers increase, instead (converging to 
) B
A . In both cases the economy converges to the high level 
equilibrium. 
2. if PI   : 
 the share of skilled workers is decreasing to zero,  (0) 0. S X   
In this case, the economy is in a poverty trap, and the 
rational behavior on the part of the workers is to opt for 
being low-skill, and for the firms to be non-innovative. This 
is the only asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium for the 
game above. 
The foregoing theorem summarises our results. 
Theorem 1 Consider the dynamic flow of workers, given by the system 
(9). There exists a threshold value,  , CS s
p   
  such that 
1. If the initial number of innovative firms PI  is larger than this 
value, i.e., PI    then, the percentage of skilled workers  () S Xt 
converges to  . B
A  
2. If the initial number of innovative firms verifies  , PI    then, 
the percentage of skilled workers  () S Xt converges to 0.  
Proof: Is a straightforward conclusion from the solutions of the 
dynamical systems (16), corresponding the the case  () 0 ES   and (14), 
corresponding to  () 0 . ES    
Definition 1 Let  " the percentage of non-innovative firms in a given 
economy in time  0 tt 
  and let   be the threshold value for the 






  (23) 
As shown in the following corollary, this number summarises the main 
characteristics of the potential evolution of the given economy. Elvio Accinelli, Silvia London, Lionello F. Punzo, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera    103
Corollary 2 If the index  1 U   then the economy is in a poverty trap, 
i.e., converges to the the low equilibrium where al worker is no skill 
worker and all firms are no innovative. If the index  1 U   then the 
economy has overcome the poverty trap, and converges to a high level 
equilibrium, the main characteristics of this equilibrium is given by the 
quotient  / BA  given by equation (19).  
Generically, an economy can be located either in a poverty trap or in a 
high-level equilibrium, depending upon the relation between the share 
of innovative firms and certain parameters (training costs and premia) 
of the model. Such relation is summarised by the index of location  . U   
In our setup, an institutional policy tending to increase the value of U  
tends also to shrink the basin of attraction of the low equilibrium. 
Thus, a policy-driven change in the parameters, in the present case by 
reducing education costs and/or increasing skill premia, may help the 
economy out of the latter's basin of attraction. 
5  DYNAMIC  EQUILIBRIA,  NASH  EQUILIBRIA  AND  THE 
EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY 
There is no possibility to observe the high Nash equilibrium (in pure 
strategies)  	  	 , 1 ,0;1 ,0 SI 
  as it is not a dynamic equilibrium. On the 
contrary, the low Nash equilibrium in pure strategies 	  	 , 0,1;0,1 NS NI 
  
is asymptotically stable, and then the poverty trap arises as a result of 
the rational conduct of economic agents. 
Let us now introduce the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy 
against the field given a profile distribution of the firms' population 
denoted by  . y   
Let  w #  be the set of distributions on the workers' population, and  F #  
be the set of distributions on the firms'. Let  (, ) w
ws n s xx x 
 #  be a 
given distribution on the workers' population and  (, 1 ) F
f yy y 
  #  a 
given distribution on the population of firms. Consider a perturbation 
on the initial distribution  . y  Let y be the perturbed distribution, let 
0    be small enough that the Euclidean distance || f yy    . 
Definition 2 Let  w x  be a best response against  . f y  We say that the 
distribution on the population of workers  , w x  is an evolutionary stable Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 53, No. 1.     104
strategy against the field given by  , f y  a distribution on the population 
of the firms, if there exist  0    such that  w x  continues being a best 
response against all distribution y in a neighborhood V  of radium  ,   
centered at  . y  
Intuitively, this means that,  w x  is the unique best response against  f y  
and that it does better than any other distribution against 
perturbations (in the distributions of the field). 
Notice that, when  , y    the distribution  (0,1) w x 
  (i.e. all workers are 
unskilled) is an ESS against the field given by  f y . 
6 ON THE DYNAMICS OF FIRMS 
Until now we have assumed that the percentage of innovative, non-
innovative firms is fixed. Workers choose their best responses in a give 
situation, but is natural to assume that the percentage of innovative 
firms are changing. We assume now that skilled workers are a fixed 
input for firms, and when the restriction for this input changes firms 
maximising again, and now taking account of the new restriction in 
this input they choose between to be innovative or no-innovative. 
The following assertion taken from Ezell and Atkinson (2008) 
summarise the main results of this section: "Technological and 
scientific innovation is the engine of U.S. economic growth, and human 
talent is the main input that generates this growth.'' 
To focus on this strategic complementarities, let us suppose that 
innovative firms have the production function 
(, , ) sn s yf z x x 
  (24) 
where  z  is the technology,  s x  the number of skilled and  ns x  of 
unskilled workers employed by the firm, and y  output. Suppose that 
technology as an input is complementary to skilled labour.
9 Hence, the 
marginal product of the technology is an increasing function of the 
number of skilled workers. 
9For instance  sn s yz x x  
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Let  () s xt be the total amount of skilled workers hired by innovative 
firms at time t . Let  01 tt   and assume the amount of skilled workers 
be increasing over time, i.e.  01 () () . ss xt xt   Then, from our hypothesis on 
the technology, follows that 






where  (, ) s cyx  stands for the short run cost function. Hence, there exists 
y  such that  01 (, ( ) ) (, () ) ; , ss cyx t cyx t y y    Figure 2 offers a graphic 
representation. 
Figure 2: Short rum costs with increasing disposal of the input skilled 
workers 
 
Then, if the supply of skilled workers is increasing, short run costs for 
innovative firms decrease towards the long-run cost. Innovative firms 
can cash positive profits and there are incentives for non innovative 
firms to change their decisions. 
The following reason reinforces the above argument on the evolution of 
the firms. Innovative firms require skilled workers whereas non-
innovative firms prefer unskilled ones, but the number of the latter 
decreases when the number of innovative firms is increasing. A positive 
net flow from unskilled to skilled workers would be observed as a 
consequence of an increasing process of innovation while this same 
process will be enhanced by an increasing supply of skilled labour. 
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6.1 Example 
To understand the situation just described let us take the following 
case: Assume the firms to be characterised by the technological 
function: 
(, , ) sn s s n s fzx x k zx x   
  (26) 
Where:  
if the firm is innovative
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0 Hh  and  ,      and   are positive constants such that  1  
 
and  1     
Assume that the technology zz 
  is a given positive constant and that 
skill premia (the bonus for the skilled worker) are  pr . It is easy to see 
that the short rum cost function is:  
1
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  (27) 
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Then, for innovative firms the cost decreases with the supply  s x  of 
skilled worker faster than for non-innovative ones. So, if at  0 tt 
  the 
fraction of innovative firms is greater than the threshold value  ,   the 
innovative firms can reduce their costs more quickly than non-
innovative firms. 
Assume that the market price for the final product is  p . If firms are 
competitive, the optimal supply for each firm is given by: 
I Is Ins
NI NIs NIns
Yp H z xx










Where  is x&  and  ins x& ,  {, } iI N I   stand for the long run demand of inputs 
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 (29) 
Let  PI    be the number of innovative firms existing at  0 tt 
  and let 
() Xp be the demand for the final product. The total supply  () Sp of the 
innovative firms will be equal to  
() ( )I Sp P IY & 
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Therefore, in the long run, a positive share of innovative firms can 
coexist with non-innovative ones. To see this, assume that there is a 
cost to become innovative,  (, ) ChH . Thus, a non-innovative firm has 
incentive to become innovative if and only if, the benefits are such 
that: 
() ( ) ( , ) BN I BI ChH   
This possibility depends, among other things, on the market share the 
firm can obtain. Were  () (, ) ( ) , BI ChH BN I  the firm would prefer to 
continue as before. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
We have constructed a game theoretical model of the strategic 
complementarities between types of firms and workers. Workers follow 
an imitative behavior and firms decide to invest or not in R&D 
depending on the conditions of labour supply. 
As in Accinelli et al. (2007) we shown that, to avoid or to exit a 
poverty trap, it is necessary to surpass threshold values in human 
capital and in investment in R&D. In this work, we have shown that 
rationality on the part of economic agents is not sufficient to avoid 
poverty traps. Only when initial conditions happen to lie beyond 
threshold values, rationality leads to an increase in social welfare. 
Workers will have, then, incentives to improve their skills, while firms 
would rip greater benefits by investing in R&D: rationality would be 
associated with a Pareto superior equilibrium. In all other cases, the 
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On the other hand, as we have also shown that there is a continuum of 
high equilibria, each associated with a distinct percentage of innovative 
firms between the threshold value and 1, we may also think of a 
continuum of countries which may be in high equilibrium though with 
different proportions of innovative firms and skilled workers. 
In the real world, markets imperfections, costs associated with changes 
in attitude and myopia on the part of rational agents, render useful the 
action of a central planer looking at the economy as a whole. In 
developed economies, a central planner trying to improve the 
equilibrium level, needs to improve the industry's overall efficiency, for 
instance by designing mechanisms that promote substitution of non 
innovative with innovative firms. In less developed economies, a 
central planner would need to find correct initial conditions such that 
rationality drives the economy toward the Pareto superior equilibrium. 
However, were she wish to help that country to exit a poverty trap, 
she would also another option: to implement a policy that reduces the 
threshold value  in such way that new feasible trajectories enter the 
basin of attraction of a high equilibrium. This objective may be 
attained by reducing educational costs or by introducing incentives for 
innovative firms to raise their premium for skill. On the basis of our 
model, the closer a country gets to the threshold, the more growth-
enhancing becomes the contribution of investment in education. 
In summary, policy makers should find the right mechanism inducing 
the parties to choose efficient behavior. It is known that policy 
differences can help us to understand differences in the degrees of 
development across countries and over time. 
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